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THE USE AND ABUSE OF FOREIGN LAW IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
GANESH SITARAMAN*

This Article provides an exhaustive typology of the uses of foreign
law in order to provide insight into whether foreign law can appropriately be used in constitutional interpretation,when it can be used, and
what the stakes and parameters are in each case. In doing so, the Article
addresses two significantproblems in the debate on foreign law.
First, much of the commentary has focused on the justificationsfor
using foreign law and the principled or practical arguments against
using foreign law. But the focus on the why of foreign law has obscured the more basic question about the ways in which foreign law
can be used, that is, the how of foreign law. Focusing on the why of
foreign law threatens to generalize arguments into debates on "foreign law" as a whole when debating particularmethods of foreign
law usage may be more helpful. Some methods of use may be more
easily justified and others totally unjustifiable.
The second problem is one of exhaustiveness: Some scholars have recognized the need to focus on the how offoreign law, but they have identified only a limited set of ways in which foreign law could be used. This
limited categorization of foreign law usage prevents clear evaluation of
which uses are appropriate. This Article's typology demonstrates that
most uses offoreign law are not problematic, and as a result, the foreign
law debate should focus specifically on the few potentially problematic
uses, rather than on 'foreign law" more generally.
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INTRODUCTION

These days, it seems everyone has something to say about
the use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation. Sparked
by the use of foreign and international materials in Atkins v.
Virginia' and Roper v. Simmons, 2 commentators have written
much on whether and when foreign law can be appropriately
considered in constitutional interpretation. 3 In opinions or
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

3. See Roger P. Alford, Misusing InternationalSources to Interpret the Constitution,
98 AM. J. INTL L. 57 (2004); Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The
Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the
Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005); Sujit Choudhry,
Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional
Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our InternationalConstitution, 31 YALE J. INTL L. 1 (2006); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons:
Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Harold Hongju
Koh, InternationalLaw as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (2004); Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a "Wider Civilization": Lawrence and the
Rehnquist Court's Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional
Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283 (2004); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (2004); Michael D.
Ramsey, InternationalMaterials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (2004); Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against borrowings and
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speeches, virtually every Supreme Court Justice has weighed
in: Justice Thomas considers foreign law to be similar to
"moods, fads, or fashions." 4 Justice Scalia thinks that foreign
law can make the opinions of Americans "essentially irrelevant."' At the same time, Justice Kennedy believes the use of
foreign law is a central part of American moral leadership in
the world because it can help express a "unified concept of
what human dignity means."6 Justice Ginsburg thinks it merely
involves "sharing with and learning from others." 7 And Justice
Breyer sees foreign law as shedding "empirical light" on com8
mon problems.
Although so many have weighed in on both sides of this
topic, and have fleshed out so many of the important issues, 9
the literature has suffered from two important problems. First,
much of the commentary has focused on the justifications for
using foreign law and the principled or practical arguments
against using foreign law. To be sure, this approach is of obvious purchase and considerable intellectual interest. Whether or
not foreign law should be used in constitutional interpretation
should be dependent on the reasons why it can or cannot be
used. But the focus on the why of foreign law has obscured the
more basic question about the ways in which foreign law can
other nonauthoritativeuses of foreign law, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 269 (2003); Kim Lane
Scheppele, Aspirational and aversive constitutionalism: The case for studying crossconstitutional influence through negative models, 1 INT'L J. CONsT. L. 296 (2003); Mark
Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006)
[hereinafter Tushnet, Knowing Less]; Mark Tushnet, The Possibilitiesof Comparative
Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999) [hereinafter Tushnet, Possibilities];
Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARv. L. REV. 129
(2005); Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 148 (2005); Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42.
4. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari).
5. Roper, 543 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. Toobin, supra note 3, at 50.
7. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks at the
99th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: "A decent
Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind": The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (Apr. 1, 2005), available at http://www.asil.org/
events/AM05/ginsburgO5O4Ol.html.
8. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9. See, e.g., Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 3 (reviewing the history of foreign
law usage); Tushnet, Knowing Less, supra note 3 (assessing the arguments against
foreign law usage).
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be used, that is, the how of foreign law. Before evaluating the
principled arguments for or against foreign law, one must
identify which method of usage is being judged. Focusing on
the why of foreign law threatens to generalize arguments into
debates on "foreign law" as a whole when it may be more helpful to debate particular methods of foreign law usage." Some
methods of use may be more easily justified and others totally
unjustifiable. The second problem is one of exhaustiveness:
Some scholars have recognized the need to focus on the how of
foreign law, but they have identified only a limited set of ways
in which foreign law could be used, in many cases defining
three categories." This limited categorization of foreign law
usage prevents clear evaluation of which uses are appropriate.
This Article seeks to introduce clarity on the varieties of foreign law 2 usage in order to provide insight into whether foreign law can appropriately be used in constitutional interpretation, when it can be used, and what the stakes and parameters

10. Of course, breaking up categories into many component parts may or may
not be helpful. The optimal amount of "clumping" of practices into categories will
depend on what value the clumping brings and what clarifications or analytic
distinctions are lost in using larger categories.
11. See Choudhry, supra note 3, at 833-39 (presenting the universalist, dialogical,
and genealogical approaches to using foreign law); Cleveland, supra note 3 (arguing that international law can be directly invoked, used as a background principle,
or cited to incorporate common values); Jackson, supra note 3, at 112 (outlining the
convergence, resistance, and engagement models); Koh, supra note 3, at 45-46
(noting that foreign law is used for identifying parallel rules, shedding empirical
light, or considering community standards); Larsen, supra note 3, at 1288-92 (describing the expository, empirical, and substantive ways foreign law is used);
Tushnet, Possibilities, supra note 3 (outlining functionalism, expressivism, and
bricolage). Others use groupings of four. See Larsen, supra note 3, at 1303-19
(categorizing foreign law under justifications of objectivity, originalism, foreign
policy, and good results); Rosenkrantz, supra note 3, at 278-82 (noting genealogical approaches, similar situations, procedural reliability, and expressive reasons).
Ernest Young makes a more exhaustive list but does not explore the categories.
See Young, supra note 3, at 149-51.
12. A brief word on "foreign law." This Article uses the term foreign law to refer
to two types of law: the domestic law of foreign states and international law. It is
worth noting that there are potentially relevant differences worth separate exploration. International law might pose fewer concerns in terms of accuracy, see infra
Part ., because there are fewer contextual complexities; customary international
law also might not face the denominator problem discussed infra text accompanying note 168-74. Likewise, international law might pose fewer democratic concerns, see infra Part I.A, because the nation has a greater ability to shape international law than it does the domestic law of foreign states.
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are in each case. It attempts to outline an exhaustive 13 set of
ways in which foreign law can be used, and it evaluates each
method with respect to the central values at issue in the foreign
law debate. It finds that most uses of foreign law are not problematic, and as a result, that the foreign law debate should focus specifically on the few potentially problematic uses, rather
than on "foreign law" more generally. Part I briefly outlines the
central arguments for and against the use of foreign law to establish a set of metrics to evaluate each particular type of foreign law usage. Part II presents a typology of ten ways in
which foreign law can be used, describes the contours of each
usage, and outlines the challenges to each usage.
I.

ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE USE OF FOREIGN LAW

Before outlining and evaluating how foreign law can be used
in constitutional interpretation, it is necessary to describe the
criteria by which to measure the acceptability of foreign law
use. There are many critiques of and justifications for the use of
foreign law, but they can be loosely grouped into two categories: arguments about liberal democratic values and arguments
about accuracy. The first category encompasses both the argument that liberal democracy is undermined when judges rely
upon the decisions of foreign courts or statements of international bodies, and the corresponding counterargument that the
existence of a democratic society depends on preconstitutional
values in the form of basic human rights or conditions for democratic participation. The second category includes both the
argument that considering foreign materials has innumerable
methodological problems such as selective or shallow use of
sources, and the corresponding counterargument that considering foreign law provides more information and thus better judicial decision making. This Part briefly considers each of these
arguments as a reference point for evaluating the various modes
of foreign law usage developed in Part II.
In addition to the arguments presented here, understanding the
more foundational debate between theories of constitutional interpretation is essential to understanding the core justifications for
13. Of course, this effort is necessarily an attempt at exhaustiveness. There may
be additional uses, but I have tried to develop as exhaustive a list as possible from
the literature and cases, without creating overlap in the categories.

658
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and criticisms of using foreign sources of law. Describing that
debate is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is worth briefly
noting a few leading theories of constitutional interpretation, as
their arguments loom large in the background of this more particular debate. Originalists believe that the Constitution should
be interpreted in accordance with the original public meaning of
the text: that is, what a person at the time of the ratification of
the provision would have understood the meaning to be.14 Under this theory, foreign sources would be permissible sources if
they would have been part of the understanding of a provision
at the time of ratification. In contrast, those who follow a moral
reading 5 of the Constitution would look to foreign sources if
they bore on answering the deep moral questions that undergird constitutional principles. Followers of James Bradley
Thayer would hold that courts should be highly deferential to
legislatures. 6 Thus, foreign sources that validate deferential
decisions may perhaps be unobjectionable to Thayerites. The
goal of this Article is not to resolve this debate but rather to provide greater clarity, and with it, helpful insights, regardless of the
theory of constitutional interpretation to which one subscribes.
A.

Arguments from Liberal Democracy

Evaluating the use of foreign law requires considering its effects on democratic decision making and on freedom and democracy as constitutional values. One trenchant critique of foreign law use argues that "a constitution is, first and foremost,
supposed to be the foundational law a particular polity has
given itself through a special act of popular lawmaking." 7 The
legitimacy and validity of constitutional law are derived from
the opinions of the people, 8 and the constitution expresses the
values of the nation through the process of democratic selfgovernance.' 9 The specificity of constitutional ideas to the nation

14. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Onginalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
15. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996).
16. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN DocTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1893).

17. Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971,
1975 (2004).
18. See Rosenkrantz, supra note 3, at 284.
19. See Tushnet, Possibilities,supra note 3, at 1228-29.
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is important, and the maintenance of a distinct constitutional
culture 20 is dependent on decisions being both created by and
accountable to the people within the country. Only then is a nation's constitution democratic and expressive of national values.
Thus, this "nationalist" approach 21 resists the use of foreign
materials in constitutional interpretation. 22 Foreign materials
represent the considered ideas not of the national citizenry but
of other communities, whose citizens have less (perhaps even
no) right to, interest in, or responsibility for the expressive values of a nation. If constitutional democracy is to mean anything,
this argument runs, it requires that the domestic community
shape constitutional meaning. To be sure, there are many sets of
expressive values within any national community, 23 but the
community must embrace a set of principles through the process
of self-governance for any particular value to be brought legitimately into the canon of constitutional values.
This nationalist approach often attaches a structural critique
to its values-based expressive critique. Given the centrality of
democracy, unelected judges are in the worst position among
the three branches of government to determine fundamental
issues of national values. In Roper, for instance, the Supreme
Court ignored that the political branches had placed reservations on various international agreements, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, explicitly reserv24
ing the right to execute minors convicted of capital crimes.
Instead, the Court cited those agreements as confirmation of its
decision to strike down the juvenile death penalty. 2 On the
structural account, the problem in Roper was that the political
branches had clearly expressed the will of the democracy
through reservations, but judges overturned that decision in
favor of international opinion. This "international counterma-

20. See Rosenkrantz, supra note 3, at 293-94.
21. Koh, supra note 3, at 52.
22. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 112.
23. See Tushnet, Knowing Less, supra note 3, at 1285.
24. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622-23 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
25. See id., 543 U.S. at 576-78 (majority opinion); see also Young, supra note 3,

at 164-65.
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joritarian problem" 26 parallels the domestic countermajoritarian
28
problem 27 and cautions a limited role for the judiciary.
Arguments from liberal democracy are not all against the use
of foreign law. Liberal democracy is conditioned on individuals
having certain basic rights. Some thus argue that constitutions
"express universal rights and principles, which in theory tran29
scend national boundaries, applying to all societies alike."
Justice Kennedy perhaps put it best: "[T]here's some underlying common mutual interest, some underlying common shared
idea, some underlying common shared aspiration, underlying
unified concept of what human dignity means." 30 Looking to
foreign and international law is a way to identify what that
common meaning of human dignity is and a way to understand how it manifests itself in the practical contexts that arise
in judicial cases. The weaker form of this universality argument
is that values and rights are less like natural law and more like
"community standards," a shared understanding of what particular ideas mean at a particular time. Whether presented inthe strong or weak form, the basic idea is that certain values or
rights are too fundamental to be left in the hands of majori31
ties- they are preconditions for democracy itself.

26. See Alford, supra note 3, at 58-59; see also Koh, supra note 3, at 55.
27. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).

28. In the context of foreign relations, the structural critique has had particular
power, given the common-law approach to foreign relations cases. Traditionally,
common-law doctrines such as the act of state doctrine and comity narrowed the
scope of what judges could decide in order to prevent international conflict or
controversy. Courts would choose not to decide in order not to offend. If contro-

versies were desired, the political branches could undertake them themselves and
pay the political consequences at the ballot box. Notably, however, the modern
use of foreign law often involves adopting human rights principles, and in that
context the limited judicial role argument might be less persuasive. By not using

foreign law, judges might create international controversy-at once rejecting the
opinions of the world and entrenching an interpretation into constitutional law.
Some argue, therefore, that it is necessary to use foreign law to avoid damaging
foreign policy. Cf. Koh, supra note 3, at 47; Larsen, supra note 3, at 1316 & n.145.
29. Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 1975; accord Choudhry, supra note 3, at 833-35;
see also Cleveland, supra note 3, at 63-87.
30. Toobin, supra note 3, at 50.
31. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (arguing that rights related to political processes need to be safe-

guarded as preconditions of democracy).
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But preconditions go beyond individual rights. Nations do
not exist in a vacuum. Rather, every nation needs to be accepted as legitimate within the international system, and that
too might require a broader role for foreign law in constitutional interpretation. The use of foreign and international law
can act as a "shout out" to other nations to signal inclusion in a
shared international community. 32 It can assist in establishing
global legitimacy for certain behaviors and practices because
practices and norms will converge over time, creating single
standards. 33 And it can help promote an international system of
34
justice that links and strengthens the community of nations.
By considering foreign and international law, a nation signals
that it is part of a broader community, earns goodwill, and
shapes the community itself. The international community, in
turn, affirms and embraces the place of the nation within it. Respect and legitimacy are, under this approach, prerequisites for
a secure, democratic state.
B.

Arguments from Accuracy

The second set of critiques and justifications for the use of
foreign law can be described broadly as involving judicial accuracy. Critics of foreign law on accuracy grounds are perhaps
inspired by Alexander Pope's famous lines: "A little learning is
a dangerous thing; Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian
spring." 3 The trouble with using foreign law is that the laws of
different countries are complex 36 and contextual.3 7 For any
judge to get even the basic facts of another country's constitutional system, structure, culture, history, and processes correct
would require considerable time, effort, and expense. 38 Even
though a factual situation or legal issue might be similar, the
constitutional text that must be interpreted might differ,39 rendering the similarities merely superficial given traditional
32. See Young, supra note 3, at 154-55.
33. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 112; Koh, supra note 3, at 47.
34. Koh, supra note 3, at 53-54.
35. ALEXANDER POPE, An Essay on Criticism, in ALEXANDER POPE 17, 24 (Pat

Rogers ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1709).
36. See Rosenkrantz, supra note 3, at 293.
37. See Tushnet, Possibilities,supra note 3, at 1265.

38. See Young, supra note 3, at 165-66; see also Ramsey, supra note 3, at 77-79.
39. See Ramsey, supra note 3, at 73-74.
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methods of constitutional interpretation. Beyond just the text, different nations might have different traditions or expressive values
with respect to even basic human rights, such as the famous difference in American and British views of libel and free speech.
In addition, a foreign decision might be based on political interests and values, or a particular political context, thus decreasing its usefulness as a well-reasoned and generalizable
position. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided
many cases in the midst of war, offering broad deference to the
political branches or avoiding significant constitutional questions, only to reverse its position and address the question
head-on after the conflict has abated. 40 Because such decisions
grow out of their political context, their use out of context
might lead to unfortunate conclusions about civil liberties or
the balance of power among the branches of government. More
commonly-and with greater difficulty for judges seeking to
use foreign law-judicial decisions may be driven by, or at
least influenced by, the political ideology of the judge. 41 Because the dominant political ideology of another nation's
courts might change over time, some past decisions might not
be followed even by the court that issued them. A judge who
seeks to use those foreign decisions would therefore need to
know the changing political dynamics of the foreign country
and the political preferences of its judiciary. As a result, ensur42
ing what Professor Mark Tushnet has called "quality-control"
might simply be too difficult, particularly given that the current modes of legal education do not involve significant training in the substantive laws of other nations and in the methodology of comparative law.
A second accuracy-based worry is that judges with little
knowledge of foreign systems will use foreign law material selectively or haphazardly. 43 The most suspicious suggest that
judges are opportunistic, seeking to support their own personal
40. Compare, e.g., Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243, 251-52 (1863) (deferring to
the proceedings of a military commission), with Ex parte Mlligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)
(refusing to uphold the verdict of a military commission because the court was
not vested with judicial power by Congress).
41. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).

42. Tushnet, Knowing Less, supra note 3, at 1294.
43. See Alford, supra note 3, at 64, 67; Koh, supra note 3, at 56; Ramsey, supra note
3, at 72-73.
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positions." They can "cherry pick" the countries they cite or
the provisions and cases within those countries because so few
people know the laws in detail. A less suspicious critique is
that judges merely rely upon whatever information is available
to them-a practice Professor Tushnet has termed "bricolage." 45 The difference between bricolage and the complexity
and context problems noted above is important: The "little
learning" argument suggests that judges have a shallow understanding of another country's legal system, but one that is potentially broad; the bricolage argument suggests that a judge's
understanding might not only be shallow but also incomplete
in breadth. To be sure, these "little learning" and selectivity
criticisms are not unique to foreign law. 46 Judges may know
very little about areas of domestic law (ERISA is a good example), 47 and nothing stops them from selecting domestic legal
materials opportunistically or haphazardly.
At the same time, however, the use of foreign law may be
beneficial or even necessary from the perspective of accuracy.
Reference to foreign law might be helpful to understand how a
constitutional provision arose and to determine what it means.
Even when it is not directly relevant to the text, foreign law use
could be beneficial to judicial perspective in decision making.
Foreign jurisdictions might have confronted similar problems
and thus may provide insightful analysis or reasoning. Judges
should consider such analysis to avoid overlooking possible
approaches. 48 Additionally, if many jurisdictions reach the
same answer, there is a better chance that the approach is
"right." It may be that "two heads are better than one." 49 Finally, the use of foreign and international law might be analo52
51
gous to a liberal education. s It may provide ideas, clarity,
44. See Ramsey, supra note 3, at 69.
45. Tushnet, Possibilities,supra note 3, at 1229.
46. Tushnet, Knowing Less, supra note 3, at 1280-81.
47. Id. at 1297.
48. Alford, supra note 3, at 57; Jackson, supra note 3, at 116; Koh, supra note 3, at
45-46 (quoting Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari)); Rosenkrantz, supra note 3, at 279.
49. Larsen, supra note 3, at 1319; see also Rosalind Dixon, A Democratic Theory of
Constitutional Comparison, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 947 (2008); Eric A. Posner & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 169-71 (2006).

50. See Tushnet, Possibilities,supra note 3, at 1236.
51. Id. at 1228.
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and contrasts 3 that help elucidate principles. Jeremy Waldron
analogizes it to learning in the scientific community: Science
"stands as a repository of enormous value to individual researchers... and it is unthinkable that any of them would try
to proceed without drawing on that repository to supplement
their own individual research." s4 So too with foreign law.
II.

A TYPOLOGY OF FOREIGN LAW

Given the values of democracy and judicial accuracy, this Part
considers how foreign law can be used in constitutional interpretation. It attempts an exhaustive list of the varieties of foreign
law usage and evaluates each with respect to the values discussed in Part I. This Part presents ten modes of foreign law usage and, for clarity, groups them into three categories: unproblematic, potentially problematic, and troublesome. It shows that
only a few types of foreign law use seriously implicate the values above, and that most uses, therefore, are acceptable.
A.

Unproblematic Uses of ForeignLaw
Mode 1: Quoting Language

Judges might cite foreign law or international law because
they like a particular turn of phrase. This type of citation is
similar to cases in which the Court cites great works of literature55 or pop music, 56 and like citations of literature or music,
this type of citation does not offend any significant values. It
does not undermine expressive, democratic, or institutional
competency values because the court is merely using words,
52. Choudhry, supra note 3, at 836.
53. Jackson, supra note 3, at 116; Koh, supra note 3, at 46, 50-51; Scheppele, supra
note 3, at 300.
54. Waldron, supra note 3, at 132-33.
55. See, e.g., Bartnicky v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 554 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Although the Court recognizes and even extols the virtues of this right
to privacy, these are 'mere words,' W. Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida, act v, sc.
3, overridden by the Court's newfound right to publish unlawfully acquired information of 'public concern."').
56. See, e.g., Sprint Commc'ns v. APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2550 (2008)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The absence of any right to the substantive recovery
means that respondents cannot benefit from the judgment they seek and thus lack
Article III
standing. 'When you got nothing, you got nothing to lose.' Bob Dylan,
Like a Rolling Stone, on Highway 61 Revisited (Columbia Records 1965).").
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not their underlying reasoning, and the sources themselves are
not authoritative. That Bob Dylan or William Shakespeare used
the phrase is not the reason the court is adopting a certain rule.
Nor is quoting language methodologically troubling. It is unnecessary to have a deep or broad knowledge of the foreign
nation's laws merely to restate a phrase. Indeed, quoting language might actually prove to have benefits without drawbacks in that it signals to other nations that prominent American jurists read their opinions.
Mode 2: IllustratingContrasts
Sometimes courts use foreign law or practices to illustrate a
contrast with domestic practices or law. In Raines v. Byrd,5 7 for
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that members of Congress did not have standing to challenge the line item veto, but
he noted that the opposite rule would not be irrational because
some courts in Europe have such a regime. Still, he concluded
that the American Constitution did not follow the European
approach.5 8 Some have called this practice "negative borrowing," 9 others, "aversive constitutionalism," 60 but the point is
the same: Seeing what another country does may help clarify
the practices one's own country seeks to avoid. As a method of
"engagement," in Professor Vicki Jackson's words, the foreign
sources are "interlocutors, offering a way of testing understanding of one's own traditions and possibilities by examining
61
them in the reflection of others'."
Illustrating contrasts does not gravely implicate any of the
values at stake in the foreign law debate. Democratic or expressive values are actually strengthened because the court is affirming a distinctive constitutional approach that is unique to
the national community. In terms of accuracy, greater information from other countries helps clarify constitutional questions
and their answers through both analogical reasoning and creative thinking. To be sure, methodological problems may arise
from the complexity of foreign law and the context of foreign

57. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
58. Id. at 828; see also Larsen, supra note 3, at 1288-89.
59. Rosenkrantz, supra note 3, at 289.
60. Scheppele, supra note 3, at 300.
61. Jackson, supra note 3, at 114.
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institutions and politics, but these methodological concerns are
of minor significance because judges merely are contrasting the
foreign situations to one they prefer. They could just as well
identify the same phenomenon in a hypothetical to draw the
contrast, or they could state their reasoning without drawing a
contrast at all.
Illustrating contrasts might also offend the idea of universal
values and engage the judiciary too far into foreign policy. If a
court rejects a universal value, it may undermine the idea of its
universality and, in the process, overextend the judicial role by
offending foreign nations. Whether countries are offended will
likely depend on the tone and style of the opinion and the nature of the provision. Ultimately, therefore, because the decision relies primarily on domestic sources, the citation and discussion of foreign law is extraneous and optional. A decision
that omits discussion of foreign law would likely not offend;
and one that discusses it respectfully would likely be received
without controversy.
Mode 3: Logical Reinforcement
Professor Steven Calabresi and Stephanie Zimdahl have identified a set of cases as "logical reinforcement" cases, "in which
the Court looks to foreign law and practice to demonstrate that
its decisions are logical and supported by reason." 62 The Court
decisions themselves rely upon domestic sources, but the Court
uses foreign sources to show that its interpretation is not unreasonable or peculiar. What is important is that the Court's decisions are not predicated on the foreign sources. It may be helpful
to imagine the judge's decision-making process temporally. The
judge would first make a decision based on domestic sources or
his own logical reasoning. Then, having reached a conclusion,
the judge would look abroad and find that others have made the
same decision. The foreign source is thus not grounds for the
decision, but merely reinforces it.
A few examples will illustrate the point. In Ker v. Illinois,63 the
Court held that it had jurisdiction over a criminal defendant
even though the defendant was forcibly kidnapped from another country in violation of an extradition treaty. Ker argued
62. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 3, at 899.
63. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
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that the extradition treaty gave him a positive right to be removed only in accordance with the treaty. 64 Justice Miller
65
found no such protection in the treaty or in the Constitution,
and then, to support his conclusion, he cited two British
cases - "authorities of the highest respectability" -holding that
forcible abduction was insufficient to limit a court's jurisdiction.6 6 In O'Malley v. Woodrough,67 the Court held that applying
a general income tax to federal judicial salaries was not unconstitutional under Article III's provision that compensation
"shall not be diminished" during tenure in office. 68 Writing for
the majority, Justice Holmes concluded that subjecting judges
to "a general tax is merely to recognize that judges are also citizens and that their particular function in government does not
generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens
the material burden of the government." 69 But Justice Holmes
also noted that the opposite rule, which the Court had upheld
only two decades earlier, 70 was contrary to the interpretations
of "other English-speaking courts," citing to decisions of Aus71
tralian, Canadian, and South African courts as illustrations.
The opinions of these courts do not appear to have been dispositive for Justice Holmes, but they did provide additional support to the Court's interpretation. The best recent example of
the logical reinforcement approach is Roper,72 in which Justice
Kennedy wrote that foreign and international law offer "respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusion[]"
that the juvenile death penalty is unconstitutional. 73 In Roper,
Justice Kennedy announced the decision of the Court based on
the domestic practices of the States, the national trend, and the

64. Id. at 441.
65. Id. at 442-43.
66. Id. at 444 (citing Ex parte Scott, (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 166, and Lopez & Sat-

tler's Case, (1858) 169 Eng. Rep. 1105).
67. 307 U.S. 277 (1939).

68. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
69. O'Malley, 307 U.S. at 282.
70. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
71. 307 U.S. at 281 (citing Cooper v. Comm'r of Income Tax (1907) 4 C.L.R 1304
(Austl.), Judges v. Attorney-General for Saskatchewan, [1937] D.L.R. 209 (Can.), and

Krause v. Comm'r for Inland Revenue 1929 A.D. at 286 (S.
Afr.)).
72. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
73. Id. at 578.
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Court's own judgment. 74 Only then did he cite foreign sources,
and they were presented as secondary confirmation of an independently made decision.
Because logical reinforcement is predicated foremost on domestic sources, methodological concerns about misunderstanding or misappropriating foreign sources are minimal. The foreign sources do very little "work" in these cases. What work
they do is indirect. First, using foreign sources for logical reinforcement provides a signal to the international community
that its opinions are considered worthy of citation and respect.
By using international views to confirm its decision rather than
as a contrast to its decision, the domestic court links the country to the larger community of nations and potentially to a converging international consensus on the particular issue. Second,
as a matter of persuasive rhetoric, the logical reinforcement
model signals to domestic readers that the decision is not ridiculous or unreasonable.
Mode 4: FactualPropositions
Judges can cite foreign or international law to establish factual propositions about history, practices, structure, or anything else. Consider the famous case of Muller v. Oregon,75
known primarily for the introduction of social scientific evidence via the Brandeis Brief. In that case, the Court distinguished Lochner v. New York's 76 assertion of a broad right to
freedom of contract and instead upheld a maximum hours law
for women working in a laundromat, under the theory that
there were inherent differences between the sexes. 77 In a footnote, Justice Brewer cited the Brandeis Brief's "very copious
collection" of legislation, reports, and studies from the United
States and from seven European countries. 78 This citation might
be considered a form of Mode 3, logical reinforcement, but Justice Brewer would not have seen it that way. He noted that
these laws and studies were not, "technically speaking, authorities," and that they did not discuss "the constitutional

74. Id.
75. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
76. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
77. Muller, 208 U.S. at 423.

78. Id. at 419-20 & n.1.
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question presented to us for determination." 79 He noted, however, that they provided "general knowledge" of "woman's
physical structure, and the functions she performs in consequence thereof." 8 This "general knowledge" comprised facts
which the Court could consider.
It is important here to distinguish between types of factual
propositions-between what we can term legal facts and nonlegal facts. Legal facts are those facts that are necessarily or easily presented in a legal opinion. Such a citation may be as simple
as a citation to a filing to establish that a company underwent
bankruptcy proceedings in a foreign country. Alternatively, a
court could cite a foreign decision to establish the foreign court's
holding and the rule of law it established. Non-legal facts are indirect facts, facts which could be determined via social science,
history, or other sources, that are stated in a foreign court opinion. For example, in Muller, the Court noted that Germany,
England, Italy, and other European states had maximum hours
laws for women. 81 This is a legal fact, and citation to legislation
would be appropriate. But, absent discussion in the law itself,
the reason for the legislation-in this case Justice Brewer's belief that it reflected inherent differences between men and
women-is a non-legal fact. The answer could be varied and
could differ from country to country.
The distinction in the type of fact is important for the accuracy
of the underlying information. Legal facts are facts that are established by the foreign court itself and are thus reliable. Non-legal
facts, on the other hand, have sources outside the foreign court
and could be established by citation to those sources directly.
The foreign court's decision or a piece of foreign legislation may
not be the best evidence for the proposition because the court or
legislature may have made a mistake, mischaracterized the evidence, or had other reasons for its decision. If the original factual
sources are available, they would form a more accurate source
from which to establish the factual proposition than would the
foreign court or legislature's decision. 2 Thus, in Muller, the

79. Id. at 420.

80. Id. at 420-21.
81. Id. at 419 n.1.
82. See Posner & Sunstein, supranote 49, at 146-47.
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Court's citation to the studies included in the Brandeis Brief13
would be more accurate than its citation to legislation.
Aside from the accuracy concern facing non-legal facts, the
citation of factual propositions is unlikely to be problematic. It
does not offend democratic or expressive values because the
citation is used to establish a fact from another country, not to
provide persuasive or authoritative reasoning for a decision. In
fact, citation to foreign law might in some cases be helpful to
establish basic facts or context surrounding the case.
B.

Potentially Problematic Uses of Foreign Law
Mode 5: Empirical Consequences

A close relative of Mode 4, factual propositions, is the use of
foreign law to determine empirical consequences. That is, foreign law might be helpful for judges to identify what consequences a certain rule might have if adopted. In these cases, the
judges seek to ascribe the occurrence or non-occurrence of an
event to a certain legal norm. Consider two examples: Mirandav.
Arizona8 and Washington v. Glucksberg.85 In Miranda, the Warren
Court held that procedural safeguards were necessary to protect
against self-incrimination when an individual is subjected to
custodial interrogation. 86 To address the counterargument that
the Miranda requirement would be a "danger to law enforcement," the Court looked to "[tihe experience in some other countries" to show that such a danger was "overplayed." 7 The Court
discussed the procedural requirements in England, 88 Scotland, 89
India, 90 and Ceylon, 91 noting that some of these countries had
even more stringent requirements than the Miranda rule would
impose. The best recent example of the empirical consequences
approach is in Washington v. Glucksberg.92 In that case, the Court
83. Muller, 208 U.S. at 419.
84. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
85. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
86. Miranda,384 U.S. at 478-79.

87. Id. at 486.
88. Id. at 486-88.
89. Id. at 488.
90. Id. at 488-89.
91. Id. at 489.
92. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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held that the right to assistance of a physician in committing suicide was not protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution and thus upheld a Washington law banning assisted suicide. In the course of his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred
to the experience of the Netherlands to show that Washington
State had a reasonable fear that allowing physician-assisted suicide might result in involuntary euthanasia. 93 In both of these
cases, foreign sources were used to explore the consequences of a
proposed rule.
This use of foreign law is potentially problematic from the
perspective of accuracy. On the one hand, greater information
fits the "liberal education" value of foreign law use. Seeing the
consequence of a rule in a different country can help identify
whether speculative consequences are likely, and, as in the case
of Glucksberg, determine whether fear of those consequences is
reasonable. But at the same time, the actual consequences of a
legal rule in any country are difficult to evaluate. In the euthanasia case, it may be that other laws, national norms, traditions,
or public or private regulations (or their absence) influence the
practice of physician-assisted suicide. The law itself might not
be the exclusive or even a significant factor.
Still, this complication does not necessarily eliminate the
value of the empirical-consequences use of foreign sources.
When a court seeks to demonstrate the occurrence of a consequence as a result of a legal rule, the accuracy problem is considerable, as any number of factors could have caused the result. But when a court, as in Glucksberg, seeks to establish that a
certain consequence is merely possible-rather than likely, inevitable, or impossible-the court may be on firmer ground. 94
Because the empirical consequences approach is at bottom a
variation on Mode 4, the factual propositions approach, it may
be abused if better social scientific evidence is available.

93. Id. at 734-35.
94. For another example, see Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 356 (2004), in
which Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, looked to the right of jury trials in
foreign countries not to determine "the meaning and continued existence of that
right under our Constitution" but merely to show that disagreement of "so many
presumably reasonable minds" implied that the Court "cannot confidently say
that judicial factfinding seriously diminishes accuracy."
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Mode 6: Direct Application
Sometimes foreign law should be applied directly. The constitutional text may require or suggest looking to foreign or international law for interpretation. In these cases, the use of foreign law via direct application merges into the foundational
debate over theories of constitutional interpretation.
A few cases will help illustrate the point. In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hendren,95 the Waite Court found that it had no
jurisdiction over a contract dispute arising during the Civil
War because the case was based on "principles of general law
alone" rather than any federal question.9 6 Justice Bradley, dissenting, argued that the claim of "extinction of a contract on the
ground of the existence of a war" 97 was based on "the laws of
the United States by which trade and intercourse with the enemy are forbidden" 98 and grounded in the constitutional powers to declare and carry out war. He then announced that "the
laws which the citizens of the United States are to obey in regard to intercourse with a nation or people with which they are
at war are laws of the United States. These laws will be the
unwritten international law, if nothing be adopted or announced to the contrary." 99 For Justice Bradley, the laws of war
applied directly to the United States as international law,
unless a contrary provision was adopted. Thus, international
law would be relevant for citation.
In Juilliard v. Greenman,1°0 one of the Legal Tender Cases, the
Court upheld the issuance of paper money. The Court found
that this power was "incident to the power of borrowing
money and issuing bills or notes of the government for money
borrowed" and was "universally understood to belong to sovereignty, in Europe and America, at the time of the framing
and adoption of the Constitution of the United States." 101 To
prove its point, the Court cited to an English chancery court
case in which the Emperor of Austria, as King of Hungary, obtained an injunction against issuance of notes that were
95. 92 U.S. 286 (1876).

96. Id. at 286-88.
97. Id. at 288 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 287.
99. Id. at 288.
100. 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
101. Id. at 447.

No. 2]

The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law

claimed to be Hungarian currency. 102 Citation to foreign law
was used to explore the contours of sovereignty, a feature built
into the Constitution and its fiscal clauses.
As Professor Michael Ramsey has noted, "[i]nternational
sources are obviously relevant to the scope of the Constitution's
structural provisions defining the international powers of the U.S.
government, where the Constitution directly appeals to matters of
international relations such as declaring war, making treaties, and
enforcing the law of nations."' 03 In these cases, the Constitution
"assume[s] an international law background," which should be
considered in interpreting the relevant terms.1°4
But which provisions "assume an international law background" is not always clear. Take, for example, the Second
Amendment's provision that a militia is "necessary to the security of a free State." 105 The term "free State" could be seen as a
reference to the states' rights debate in the Founding Era and
thus not be linked to international understandings of government power; but it could also be interpreted as "free country," as
Professor Eugene Volokh has recently argued. 0 6 Should we cite
to foreign sources to determine the meaning of "free State"?
Perhaps the most debated example is the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments." 0 7 In
Trop v. Dulles,10 8 the Warren Court held that forfeiture of citizenship was unconstitutional as punishment for the crime of
wartime desertion. Although he found that citizenship was
"not subject to the general powers of the National Government," Chief Justice Warren concluded that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause would forbid such a penalty.' °9 "The
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment," he wrote,
102. Id.
103. Ramsey, supra note 3, at 71; see also Neuman, supra note 3, at 82-84; cf. Alford,
supra note 3, at 58 n.10 (noting an example of Congress's extension of the copyright

term to match that of the European Union, which it justified under the Commerce
Clause); Koh, supra note 3, at 47 (discussing how constitutional principles of liberty,

equal protection, and due process have a long international lineage).
104. Neuman, supra note 3, at 82.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
106. Eugene Volokh, "Necessary to the Security of a Free State," 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 1-6 (2007).

107. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
108. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
109. Id. at 92-104 (plurality opinion).
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"is nothing less than the dignity of man."110 The meaning of the
phrase is "not precise" and its scope is "not static"; rather, the
meaning must be determined by considering "the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."'' Chief Justice Warren then declared that the "civilized
nations of the world" reject the idea that statelessness can be
imposed as punishment." 2 In Trop, therefore, international understandings of cruelty were built into the Eighth Amendment.
Unlike provisions relating to war or foreign affairs, the
Eighth Amendment does not obviously require some international background assumptions to determine its meaning. But
it may still be the case that international or foreign perspectives
are relevant to the scope of the provision. Ultimately, the use of
foreign law through direct application depends on one's theory
of constitutional interpretation. On one side are those like Justice Scalia, who argue that the meaning of constitutional provisions should be determined by the ordinary meaning of the
words at the time of ratification.11 3 On the other side are those
like Professor Ronald Dworkin, who see the words of many
constitutional provisions as establishing moral principles that
require grappling with deep moral questions for successful interpretation.11 4 And in their midst, numerous other theories of
constitutional interpretation might take different approaches to
considering foreign law in determining the meaning of constitutional provisions. Depending on which theory one follows,
the Court's action in a case like Trop will look very different.
Justice Scalia might reject the approach because "cruel and unusual" had a specific public meaning at ratification; Dworkinians might embrace it as a valuable way to consider deep moral
questions of human dignity.
In addition to those specific textual provisions which incorporate international ideas, constitutional interpretation may
require the use of foreign law when two constitutions share
"genetic" or "genealogical"1 5 relationships. Genetic relationships exist when one constitution influenced the framing of an110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 100.
Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 102.
Scalia, supra note 14.

114. See DWORKIN, supra note 15.

115. Choudhry, supra note 3, at 838; Rosenkrantz, supra note 3, at 278.
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other, or when two constitutions were influenced by another. 116
Genealogical relationships exist when one constitutional order
literally springs from another. For example, the Canadian Constitution recognizes "existing aboriginal... rights," requiring
an understanding of British imperial constitutional law to determine the content of those rights. 117 The U.S. Constitution also
inherited principles governing aboriginal rights from British
imperial law. Thus, according to Professor Choudhry, when
Canadian constitutional interpreters look to decisions of Chief
Justice Marshall on questions of aboriginal rights, they are using the shared genealogical relationship of the U.S. and Canadian Constitutions as a basis for clarifying constitutional meaning."1 8 When a constitution influences the framing of another
constitution or when one constitution is the offspring of another, citation to interpretive decisions of the older constitution
may be necessary or at least helpful in determining the origins,
purpose, and scope of a provision, and in understanding how
that provision has been understood in light of changing conditions over time.
Whether one sees these forms of direct application as appropriate uses of foreign law will depend largely on one's theory
of constitutional interpretation. But there is, at the very least, a
persuasive argument that genetic provisions, genealogical provisions, and provisions obviously related to structural foreign
affairs powers are good candidates for the use of foreign law
under any theory-even despite problems with selectivity, bricolage, and the complexity of context." 9 Rejecting international
sources that clarify the meaning of "Letters of Marque and Reprisal" 20 or "Treaties"1 2' would seem to undermine careful
constitutional interpretation. And ignoring genetic or genealogical relationships would leave a judge without potentially
valuable sources of information. In cases where the provisions
are not obviously linked to foreign law assumptions, advocates
of foreign law naturally must rely more heavily on their theory
116. Choudhry, supra note 3, at 838; see also Louis Henkin, A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 533 (1993).
117. Choudhry, supra note 3, at 838 & n.81 (quoting Canadian Constitution).
118. Id. at 871.
119. See supra Part I.B.
120. U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 11.
121. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. IH, § 2, cl. 1.
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of constitutional interpretation. If their theory provides recourse to foreign sources, use of foreign law would not offend
democratic or expressive values. Judges would not be offending other branches of government through judicial foreign policy
making because international standards would be supported.
And because the domestic constitution is democratically adopted,
any challenges based on democratic and expressive values would
be unpersuasive under a theory of interpretation providing recourse to foreign and international sources.
Mode 7: PersuasiveReasoning
Justice Breyer has suggested that judges in all countries face
the "same kinds of problems ...armed with the same kinds of
legal instruments." 122 The use of foreign law for persuasive reasoning argues that different nations may face similar situations
and therefore one judge's analysis of a situation may be helpful
to another judge elsewhere.1 23 These "parallel rules" 124 provide
justification for considering foreign law. Persuasive reasoning
involves a judge considering the argumentation or logic of a
foreign decision and using that argument in his decision. The
foreign case is not authoritative, but merely provides an example of an intelligent person reasoning through a legal problem-perhaps similar to an academic article that seeks to analyze a problem and suggest an answer. In other words, the
substance of the reasoning and not the identity of the source
provides the reason for adopting the argument.
Evaluating persuasive reasoning is necessarily a theoretical
enterprise. As Professor Joan Larsen has noted, courts rarely
engage in this type of foreign law usage: "None of the recent
opinions invoking international or comparative law sources
has explicitly looked to the reasoning of a foreign decisionmaker." 12 Even though courts generally have not looked to
reasoning, it is still possible to determine what might be at stake
in their use of persuasive reasoning. Democratic or expressive
122. Alford, supra note 3, at 57 (quoting Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court, Rflexions Relatives au Principe de Fraternit6, Address to the 30th Congress of
the Association of French-Speaking Constitutional Courts (June 20, 2003), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publinfo/speeches/sp-06-2003.html).
123. See Rosenkrantz, supra note 3, at 279.
124. Koh, supra note 3, at 45.
125. Larsen, supra note 3, at 1286.
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values are not likely to be curtailed because the reasoning is persuasive, rather than authoritative. The court is merely searching
for persuasive logical reasoning and it happens to discover that
reasoning in a court case rather than a treatise or article. The
court's practice will likely strengthen universal norms and international standards because citation and interconnection between courts create a shared transnational jurisprudence. 126 Informational values are fulfilled because the additional
information might provide interpretations that would have
been incompletely theorized or even overlooked. But there is a
significant difficulty: methodology. In cases of persuasive reasoning, the court must of course pay close attention to the internal logic of the opinion. But it is also crucial that the court
consider the context surrounding the foreign case. The texts of
the provisions interpreted might be different, the foreign country's core values might differ, and the politics of the foreign
country may have been instrumental in shaping the outcome of
the decision. 127 So long as the court is careful, however, persuasive reasoning can be an effective way to use foreign law.
C.

Troublesome Uses of Foreign Law
Mode 8: Authoritative Borrowing

The first of the problematic uses of foreign law, authoritative
borrowing, involves a judge using a foreign law decision as
binding precedent on his court. The basic idea of authoritative
borrowing is captured in the distinction between what Professor Schauer has called substantive reasons and contentindependent reasons for following a rule. 128 A substantive reason for following a rule is a reason grounded in an inherent
value of the practice-among other things, the practice could
be efficient, desirable, or fair.129 For example, people look both
ways before crossing the street because they do not want to be
hit by an oncoming car. Safety is a substantive reason. In contrast, content-independent reasons are reasons for following a
rule that derive solely from the fact of another stating the rule.
126. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65-103 (2004).

127. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
128. See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA L. REV. 1931, 1935 (2008).
129. Id.
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A child may obey a parent who says "because I said so," not
because the child understands the substantive reasons for the
command, but merely because the parent orders it.13° Authoritative borrowing is the use of foreign materials for contentindependent reasons; Mode 7, persuasive reasoning, would use
foreign materials for substantive reasons.
Though the U.S. Supreme Court has not pursued authoritative borrowing, Argentina's Supreme Court has.'31 The Argentine constitutional tradition was founded on the model of the
U.S. Constitution, and its doctrinal interpretations are considered authoritative statements of Argentine constitutional law.
Although Argentina had two constitutions in the early nineteenth century that were not inspired by the U.S. Constitution,
the Constitution of 1853 was grounded in the American model
in hopes that the constitutional system would create the same
kind of political and economic success that Americans enjoyed. 1 32 To achieve these goals, the Argentine framers intended
that "substantive interpretations of the U.S. Constitution
should also be binding in Argentina." 133 Thus, Domingo F.
Sarmiento, an important intellectual figure and later President
of Argentina, wrote in his commentary on the 1853 Constitution
that "North American constitutional law, the doctrine of its
statesmen, the declarations of its tribunals, the constant practice
in analogous or identical points, are authority in the Argentine
Republic, can be alleged in litigation,.., and adopted as genuine
interpretation of our own Constitution."134 To the extent that the
Argentine Constitution reflects a genetic relationship, the use of
American interpretations by the Argentine Court is a form of
Mode 6, direct application. But when the Argentine Court has
relied on U.S. precedents in spite of its own (and distinct) constitutional provisions and interpretations, it is a form of authorita35
tive borrowing. For example, in Ercolano v. Lanteri de Renshaw,'
the Argentine Court upheld a rent-control scheme based on the
130. Id at 1936.
131. See Rosenkrantz, supra note 3, at 270, 273.

132. Id. at 270-71.
133. Id. at 273.
134. Id. at 273 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting DOMINGO FAUSTINO
SARMIENTO, COMENTARIOS DE LA CONSTUciON DE LA CONFEDERACiON ARGEN-

TINA DE 1853, at 59 (1929)).

135. Corte Supreme de Justicia [CSJN], 28/4/1922, "Ercolano v. Lanteri de Renshaw,"
Fallos (1922-136-161) (Arg.).
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U.S. Supreme Court case of Block v. Hirsh,136 despite the presence of a textual provision different from the U.S. Constitution
137
and contrary Argentine precedent.
Authoritative borrowing is obviously problematic. It offends
democratic values by directly implementing the law of a foreign country without judges considering domestic values and
interpretive materials. It is methodologically problematic because it requires a considerable amount of knowledge about a
foreign jurisdiction's law, culture, history, and tradition, one
that judges are unlikely to possess. Although it would not offend foreign nations and would add another adherent to what
could be considered growing international values and norms,
because the court's decision is not independent but rather reliant on another nation, it provides only marginal analytic support to those values. Judges do not find that the people of their
nation do or should adhere to such values; rather, they find
that another people adheres to its own values. Authoritative
borrowing, then, appears to be a clear abuse of foreign law.
But we cannot stop there. Of particular worry is that the
category of authoritative borrowing might be broader that this
account so far has suggested. Even distinguishing between content-independent and substantive reasons for borrowing, and
thus between authoritative and merely persuasive sources, it
may be that citation of a source for any purpose-whether for
logical reinforcement, persuasive authority, or even mere factual propositions-grants legitimacy to that type of source and
can transform it into an authoritative source. As Professor
Schauer has argued, "in reality, the status of an authority as an
authority is the product of an informal, evolving, and scalar
process by which some sources become progressively more
and more authoritative as they are increasingly used and accepted." 13 8 As an example, Professor Schauer argues that the
Tenth Circuit need not cite the Second Circuit in a securities
case, but given that the Second Circuit is the most important
court in securities law, failure to cite to its decisions "would
likely raise some eyebrows." 139 That raising of eyebrows indicates an expectation of citation; in practice and over time, the
136. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).

137. See Rosenkrantz, supra note 3, at 275-76.
138. Schauer, supra note 129, at 1956-57.
139. Id. at 1958.
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citation transforms an optional authority of the Second Circuit
into what is essentially a mandatory authority. In the context of
foreign law usage, using foreign sources for innocuous purposes could result in foreign law becoming a legitimate source
that people expect to be cited-even in cases in which the use
of foreign law is not innocuous. Under this line of thinking, authoritative foreign law usage may grow over time.
This is essentially a slippery slope argument. 14 It holds that
the citation of foreign law in the instant case might be innocuous because it is not authoritative, but fears the possibility that
in the future, litigants and judges will take nonauthoritative
foreign law citations as an indicator that foreign law is a legitimate source of authority in dissimilar situations. In essence,
it is a "general plea for caution in the face of an uncertain future." 141 But slippery slope arguments are not trump cards, as
there are many strategies for reducing the likelihood of future
slippage. 142 In the case of foreign law, the best response to the
slippery slope argument is to have a more completely theorized and precise understanding of how, when, and why foreign law can be used. Drawing these lines requires meeting one
of two conditions: The lines must be precise, or the reasons for
the lines must be comprehensible. 143 If the lines drawn between
permissible and impermissible uses are imprecise, slippery
slopes may be more likely, as future cases could extend a vague
standard."' Lines will also be more effective if the reasons for
the lines are comprehensible. Although there is no inherent
reason why arbitrarily drawn lines cannot stop slippage, when
decision makers do not know why a line was drawn in a particular place, they will have a harder time justifying the decision when confronted with the inevitable question: Why draw
140. For discussion of the nature of slippery slope arguments, see generally Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985); Eugene Volokh, The
Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003).

141. Schauer, supra note 140, at 376.
142. Professors Rizzo and Whitman provide seven: (1) accepting trade-offs; (2)
creating arbitrary "stopping" rules; (3) appealing to higher standards; (4) adopting open-ended rules; (5) altering the scope and power of precedent; (6) establishing presumptions and levels of scrutiny; and (7) creating supermajority requirements or constitutional constraints. See Mario J.Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman,
The Camel's Nose Is in the Tent: Rules, Theories, and Slippery Slopes, 51 UCLA L. REV.

539, 579-91 (2003).
143. See Schauer, supra note 140, at 370-73, 378-81.
144. Id. at 370-73.
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the line there? In the absence of comprehensible reasons, decision makers may be more cautious about the enterprise of line
drawing altogether. 145 The slippery slope argument, then, does
not imply that all citations of foreign sources will become authoritative and thus problematic, but cautions that clarity is
vital to when, how, and why courts use foreign law.
Mode 9: Aggregation
The aggregated information approach collects jurisdictions
that adhere to a particular position, aggregates them into a larger total, and uses numerical consensus to indicate the validity
of the widely held position. Aggregation can sometimes be undertaken as a form of logical reinforcement with merely persuasive force (Mode 3), but the distinction between aggregation
and logical reinforcement is that aggregation is justified under
theories which give normative force and legitimacy to the numerical dominance of the particular position. Because aggregation has normative weight, it faces significant challenges. Indeed, aggregation should be the locus of future debates on the
use of foreign law.
The precise contours of the aggregation approach can be described in different ways. Professor Ernest Young calls this approach "nose-counting authority," 146 or situations in which the
Court "is deferring to numbers, not reasons." 147 Professor Jeremy
Waldron has tried to recover the idea of the ius gentium, which
he defines as "a body of law purporting to represent what various domestic legal systems share in the way of common answers
to common problems." 148 It is a "source of normative insight
grounded in the positive law of various countries,"1 49 and its
goal is "not to preempt [domestic] law but to guide its elaboration and development." 150 Whether it is called nose-counting or
the ius gentium, the basic idea is the same: the aggregation of
countries' practices with respect to a particular issue or position.1 5'
145. Id. at 380-81.
146. Young, supra note 3, at 153.
147. Id. at 155.
148. Waldron, supra note 3, at 133.
149. Id. at 143.
150. Id. at 139.
151. Professor Young makes an important distinction between his approach and
Professor Waldron's. Professor Waldron's ius gentium, he notes, uses foreign law
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It is not entirely clear whether the Supreme Court has actually used the aggregated information approach in its decisions.
5 2 for example, Justice Kennedy grounded the decision
In Roper,"
of the Court in conclusions that were independent of foreign
law-namely, the practice of the States, the national trend regarding the juvenile death penalty, and the Court's "own independent judgment." 153 Having analyzed the juvenile death
penalty under those rubrics, he then looked to foreign law because "[tihe opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions." 1 4 The Court was therefore
explicit in not granting normative weight to foreign practices.
But at the same time, some commentators have worried that
the confirmatory use in Roper is frighteningly close to an authoritative usage of aggregate practices. Professor Young, for
example, argues that "[iut is unclear exactly what 'confirm'
means in this context" and questions whether a conclusion "not
confirmed by foreign practice [would] be insufficient."155 Although he acknowledges reasons why the Court's confirmatory
approach could be taken seriously, Professor Young is concerned that the Court might be more willing to impose its own
moral beliefs if other nations concur. In that case, foreign law
use becomes authoritative.15 6 Thus, even if the Court did not
use the aggregation approach in Roper, it is still important to
determine the promise and pitfalls of aggregation.
Aggregation of foreign law is most frequently defended under "many minds" arguments, which claim that the opinions of

as "a repository of common wisdom" and distinguishes nose-counting as relying
on the fact of foreign practice, not on the wisdom of the practice. Young, supra
note 3, at 153. The line, however, is not so clear. Professor Waldron likens the use
of the ius gentium to scientific processes. He ultimately concludes that those who
think of "law as a matter of reason may well be willing to approach it in a scientific spirit that relies not just on our own reasoning but on some rational relation
between what we are wrestling with and what others have figured out." Waldron,
supra note 3, at 147. This looks much like the aggregated information approach
described here.
152. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
153. Id. at 564.
154. Id. at 578 (emphasis added).
155. Young, supra note 3, at 154.
156. Id. at 155-56.
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many will be better than those of just one,15 7 but there are many
varieties of "many minds" arguments, each of which has different contours and risks. Professor Adrian Vermeule has recently outlined four types of "many minds" arguments: the information aggregation approach, the evolutionary approach,
arguments from tradition, and arguments about deliberation. 5 8
The information aggregation approach is most closely associated with the Condorcet Jury Theorem. The theorem posits that
if each person has a greater than fifty percent likelihood of being correct when choosing between two alternatives, the
greater number of people, the more likely a majority vote of the
people will result in the correct answer. The information aggregation approach requires first that individuals are competent (that is, more likely than not of getting the correct answer
and, as a result, better than random) and second that their
guesses are statistically independent such that any biases are
uncorrelated.'5 9 It remains unclear whether independence is
compromised by deliberation, social background, training, or
deference to opinion leaders, but if those factors do undermine
independence of opinion, then the aggregation may not result
in more accurate collective decisions.160 Crowds would thus not
have the wisdom they are so often credited with having. The
evolutionary approach seeks to explain the development and
maintenance of a specific practice or a general system over a
period of time. In evolution, mutations come about randomly,
but the survival of the mutant gene is based on its fitness. Similarly, regardless of how a legal practice comes into being, over
time those practices or systems that are more fit will continue
and will tend towards efficacy.1 6' Professor Vermeule's third
species of "many minds" arguments is those from tradition,
which assert that tradition embodies the collective wisdom of
the past.1 62 Arguments from tradition are problematic because of
the difference between individuals and generations. Although
157. See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 49, at 136 (justifying the citation of

foreign law as potentially providing accurate information under the Condorcet
Jury Theorem).
158. See Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS (2009), http://ojs.hup.harvard.edu/index.php/jla/article/view7/33.

159. See id.

7-9.

160. Id. at 10.
161. See id. at If 21-27.
162. Id. at T 40.
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an old woman might have greater wisdom from her considerable experience, later generations actually have more information, perspective, and thus wisdom than those that came before.
New generations have the benefit of knowing the results, posi-3
16
tive or negative, of plans and experiments of prior generations.
The final approach, arguments about deliberation, asserts that
through communication and discussion, groups can come to better decisions. 164 Deliberation, however, can often lead to errors,
165
extremism, or entrenched disagreement.
The aggregation mode of foreign law usage parallels Professor Vermeule's information aggregation justification for "many
minds" arguments. Courts around the world confront similar
questions. If we assume that each high court has a greater than
fifty percent chance of reaching the right decision, then aggregating the use of foreign law provides helpful information that
tends towards accuracy. There is, however, an important caveat. Under Professor Vermeule's typology, aggregation theo166
ries are synchronic-they explain a position at a certain time.
In contrast, the decisions of foreign courts take place over a
long period of time, with each court aware of, and potentially
influenced by, other courts. Such influence is likely to undermine the Condorcet Jury Theorem's requirement of statistical
independence and uncorrelated biases among participants.
The threat that an earlier decision may have an effect on another's later decision-and therefore undermine the value of decision under the "many minds" approach-indicates that the
aggregation of foreign law must confront the problem of cascades to be a viable use of foreign law. Cascades come in two
varieties: informational and reputational. 1 67 Informational cascades exist when later actors follow the decisions of earlier actors
not because they are persuaded by the reasons of the earlier actors, but because they give undue weight to the earlier decisions
or merely follow the crowd. Reputational cascades occur when
163. Id.
42.
164. See id. at 91
165. Id. at 1 46-48.
166. Professor Vermeule makes this point with respect to invisible-hand approaches, but the distinction is significant for intentional approaches as well. Intentional-aggregation approaches rely upon statistical independence and uncorrelated biases, but the passage of time may make these preconditions less likely.
167. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 49, at 161-62.
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later actors follow the decisions of earlier actors, perhaps even
against their own opinions, because they want to maintain a certain reputation. To see how a cascade works, compare the situation of ten countries that have adopted a system of authoritative
borrowing-and thus all interpret a constitutional value following the parent country's decisions-with the situation of ten
countries that all adopt the constitutional value of one country
through persuasive reasoning. Although it appears in the first
case that all eleven countries have affirmed a certain value, in
reality, one country has made a principled argument for a rule
and ten have merely gone along with it. It would be misleading
and potentially fallacious to grant added weight through aggregation to those decisions. There is no independence in their
judgments. In the second case, however, each of the eleven countries has independently found the rule persuasive. Thus, the aggregation of the eleven countries' judgments may have some
greater normative weight.
To guard against the problem of cascades, courts would need
to engage in a meta-analysis of foreign law usage within each of
the countries whose practice is being aggregated. The court aggregating foreign practices would need to know how each individual court used foreign law in its decision-making process. If a
country cited foreign law only as persuasive reasoning, for example, then its preferences could likely be aggregated as not suffering from informational cascades. If the country used authoritative borrowing, however, its decisions would be of questionable
use because they would likely violate the independence condition
necessary to successful aggregation. Importantly, correcting for
reputational cascades might be impossible, as it is unlikely that
courts will declare that the primary reason for their decision is
not principle but rather desire to be accepted or to maintain a
certain reputation in the world community.
A second threat to aggregating decisions successfully is the
denominator problem. 168 When aggregating foreign decisions,
courts will distinguish between the number of courts that have
adopted the rule in question and the total number of courts
considered. If the ratio is high, the deciding court can refer to
widespread opinions. If the ratio is low, the court will know
that the rule is limited to a few outliers. The problem is that
168. See generally Young, supra note 3.
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judges may be selective or haphazard in choosing which nations constitute the denominator'69 and thus skew the aggregation. Still, determining which countries to use in the aggregation process is not impossible. Professors Eric Posner and Cass
Sunstein suggest three conditions for including a foreign nation's sources: The foreign source must reflect private information (for example, information that the U.S. court could get
more easily from the foreign court than from other sources), the
foreign source must address a similar problem, and the foreign
source must reflect an independent judgment. 170 Because this
approach is tailored to the particular case at hand, it might itself create some risk of "cherry picking" foreign nations whose
practices align with a certain outcome. It may also require considerable knowledge of foreign systems, a problem discussed
extensively above. 171 It is worth noting that the Court itself has
used different baselines for evaluating decisions, including the
"English-speaking world" 172 and "civilized countries." 173 Professors Posner and Sunstein's narrow approach, however, will
likely be better than these blanket categories or a category such
as "liberal democracies." The broader rule would be substantially overinclusive, requiring consideration of foreign practices
when the country's context might be so different as to render a
comparison unhelpful or, worse, misleading. Such a rule would
be substantially underinclusive, rejecting comparisons to nondemocracies even though a non-democracy might have a helpfully similar provision. 17 4
The third problem with aggregation is that it faces all the accuracy-based challenges that confronted the persuasive reasoning approach: the complexity of foreign legal systems; the context in terms of text, values, structure, and politics; and the
challenges of comparative education for lawyers. In the case of
169. See Alford, supra note 3, at 64, 67; Koh, supra note 3, at 56; Ramsey, supra
note 3, at 73, 82.
170. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 49, at 144.

171. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
172. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (English-speaking peoples); Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (same).
173. The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 387 (1918).

174. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 49, at 159. Indeed, as Professors Posner and
Sunstein note, the fact of a non-democracy supporting certain norms might actually
give more weight to that norm than if a liberal democracy supported the norm. Id.
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aggregation, each of these challenges is multiplied by the number of nations whose laws are being aggregated. The requirement of careful analysis is thus considerably harder to meet in
cases of aggregation.
Finally, aggregation raises serious questions regarding democracy and the expressive values of the nation. To be sure,
judges can choose when to use aggregation, thus providing
some accountability to their usage. 175 But at the same time, aggregation provides authoritative influence on the decision at
hand. It takes the consensus rule of many nations as itself reason for deciding in line with that rule-absent the justifications
given in the particular jurisdictions. In cases when the expression of national values is at stake, such a policy would give
weight to contrary foreign opinions even though they conflict
with longstanding domestic traditions or national opinion.
The challenge from democracy and expressive values, however, might be less persuasive if we consider whether the aggregation of foreign law is determinative. Even if "[f]oreign
practice is not the only reason" considered in making a decision, 176 it may nonetheless become the determinative factor. Let
us call this the "determinativeness" issue. 177 To be sure, one's
approach to determinativeness will depend on the theory of
constitutional interpretation to which one subscribes and on
the nature of the constitutional provision at issue. Even
originalists will consider foreign law, regardless of determinacy, if foreign understandings are necessary to interpreting
the constitutional provision as it was understood at the time of
ratification. 178 Still, to determine how concerned we should be
175. See Tushnet, Knowing Less, supra note 3, at 1285-86.
176. Young, supra note 3, at 156.
177. This phenomenon occurs elsewhere in the law. The most obvious example
is in the affirmative action context, in which the use of race is allowed as one of
many factors, but not the only factor, in higher education admissions. In that case
too, it may be that race is the factor that tips the balance. Is race then not decisive
for admission? To some extent, the question of determinativeness is related to the
question of authority and persuasiveness discussed under Mode 9, authoritative

borrowing. Even if an authority is merely persuasive, not authoritative, it could
still be the factor that tips the balance-the determinative factor.
178. In Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), for example, the Court held

that prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, had a right to habeas corpus and that
the Military Commissions Act was an unconstitutional suspension of that right.
Id. at 2273-74. In dissent, Justice Scalia stated that, even excluding Supreme Court
precedent that he believed supported his position, he would have affirmed the
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about the determinativeness issue, it may be helpful to parse
carefully the situations in which determinativeness arises. Democratic and expressive values are implicated only when the
aggregation of foreign decisions is granted normative weight
and when aggregation results in a determinative outcome. 179 In
only that set of cases, the opinions of the world may potentially
overthrow the opinions of the domestic constituency.
These situations can be broken down into four cases, as a
function of whether domestic and foreign law are each determinate or indeterminate and whether they concur or conflict
with each other. The first case is one in which domestic law is
determinative and foreign law concurs. In those cases, the use
of foreign law is merely confirmatory and serves no authoritative function. Domestic law would have yielded the same results, so democratic concerns are limited to broader issues of
symbolism in constitutional interpretation. In terms of practical
consequences, democracy has not faltered. The second type of
case is one in which domestic and foreign law are both indeterminate. The use of foreign law is irrelevant here, too, from
the perspective of practical consequences because it does not
change the decision. The ultimate decision will have to be
made on some ground. It might be arbitrary and even overextend the judicial role, but the use of foreign law is not problematic on democracy grounds because it does not lead to any determination, and is thus not authoritative. Deference to political
branches or delay might be a better solution for courts in the
face of complete indeterminacy, but again, the foreign law issue is not the central one.
The third type of case arises when the domestic law is determinative and the foreign law conflicts. Presumably, the domestic law should trump the foreign law. To argue otherwise
would undermine democracy. But as Professor Rubenfeld has
argued, people may believe the foreign law should trump national law in some subject areas.180 This argument relies upon
the idea that certain values are universal and not subject to
court of appeals given the history and text of the Suspension Clause. To support
his understanding of the Clause, he cited foreign law, including cases and practices of British courts. Id. at 2303-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. Of course, this does not apply only to aggregations of foreign law, but to
any use of foreign law with normative weight.
180. Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 1975-76.
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democratic decisions. In essence, this is the countermajoritarian
virtue of courts-they can protect or aspire to entrench fundamental rights from majorities that infringe upon them. Whether
foreign law should be used in these cases depends, then, on
whether we believe that some values are universal, and if so,
which values those are. It is most likely that issues such as
separation of powers or unique structural regimes such as federalism would be excluded. Those issues are more likely to be
grounded in the particulars of a specific national system and
are thus less general and universal. Questions of fundamental
human rights-life and death, slavery, torture, and the likeare better candidates for cases in which foreign law could
trump domestic law. Ultimately, the question comes down to
which rights are included -and that question is certainly contestable, as is the meaning of those human rights. Still, the
scope of the contest over these meanings is relatively limited.
In cases where the fundamental rights that a court seeks to protect are described in a treaty or convention or are a matter of
customary international law, the question is merely whether
those rights are incorporated by domestic law. The situation in
which this case is potentially troubling, then, is limited to the
much narrower situation of incorporating rights that are not
enshrined in international law. The universal values argument
presents only one side of the coin. Merely being part of the
community of nations that shares a norm might be reason itself
for adopting the norm; it might provide access to those nations,
legitimacy, goodwill, or standing. Each of these reasons is independent of the merits of the norm itself. A court might even
disagree with the norm but believe that the link to a broader
network of nations sharing that norm has greater value than its
contrary opinion. The ultimate and debatable question here is
whether courts or more democratic bodies should make the
decision to adhere to international norms for extrinsic reasons.
The final type of case is one in which domestic law is indeterminate and foreign law is clear. This is probably the hardest
category because it raises serious concerns. First, the foreign
law would determine the outcome of a particular case, which
seems to undermine democratic values of self-governance. At
the same time, however, the values at stake might be preconstitutional or pre-democratic (in the case of Ely's process
values) or they might be basic human rights to which all persons should be entitled, regardless of place. In other words,
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they might implicate what Justice Kennedy has called a "unified concept of what human dignity means."1"' Moreover,
given the indeterminacy on the domestic scene, other nations'
efforts to grapple with a similar problem and reach a conclusion provide added information that is valuable for moral and
political consideration. Foreign law could provide important
additional information that helps a court get the "right" answer
in cases of indeterminacy. Still, methodologically, issues of selectivity, complexity of context, and cascading effects will make
the foreign law enterprise difficult. An alternative approach in
such cases is to reject foreign law and require judges to defer to
political branches or make no decision. Justice O'Connor appears to have taken this approach in Roper, preferring the "Nation's legislatures" to the judgment of the Court.'8 2 Notably,
Justice O'Connor added that she had no general problem with
the use of foreign law in Eighth Amendment cases. 18 3 The
downside to this approach is that judicial omission might be
equivalent to judicial action, and thus have real consequences.
The significance of breaking down the determinativeness issue is that in practical consequentialist terms, the use of foreign
law through aggregation is seriously in conflict with democratic values only in situations where domestic law is unclear
and foreign law is clear. Although it is difficult to determine
how frequently these situations arise compared to other cases
in which foreign law is used, further debate on the use of aggregation should focus on these cases in particular or on the
underlying question of constitutional interpretation generally.
Mode 10: No Usage
The final mode of foreign law usage is not using foreign law
in constitutional interpretation. This approach would certainly
not offend democratic values of self-governance because decisions made would be limited to using domestic materials that
would have a place in the constitutional structure. Still, and
perhaps counterintuitively, not citing foreign law does not entirely solve the problem of foreign law usage. If some rights are
so important as to be pre-constitutional, then perhaps foreign
181. Toobin, supra note 3, at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 588 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 604.
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law should be included to identify those rights and bring their
normative influence to bear, despite the democratic concerns.
This is the purpose of a countermajoritarian court in the political system.1 8 As importantly, not using foreign law might result in absurd and inaccurate results. As the sections describing
Mode 4, factual propositions, and Mode 6, direct application,
showed, there are many instances when foreign law must or
certainly should be used in constitutional interpretation. A
blanket ban on the citation and discussion of foreign and international materials would not lead to sound decision making in
those cases. Important facts, textual provisions, and other interpretive materials may be needed in the process of domestic
constitutional interpretation.
CONCLUSION

This breakdown of the various uses of foreign law presents
some compelling conclusions. First, the vast majority of ways
in which foreign law can be used are not necessarily problematic, meaning that any broad, zero-sum debate over foreign law
use is largely overblown. The first seven of the ten uses of foreign law are relatively unproblematic and are not challenged
significantly by arguments from either democratic values or
methodology and accuracy. Importantly, a blanket position of
not citing to foreign law is problematic because some uses of
foreign law are necessary. Debates over the use of foreign law
should be more precisely focused on the manner in which foreign law is used-blanket pronouncements about "fads" or the
"irrelevance" of the foreign citizenry's opinions might be good
rhetoric, but they do not find much analytic purchase unless
limited to a narrow mode of foreign law usage.
At the same time, the foreign law debate cannot be clearly
resolved by an intuitive distinction such as that between authoritativeness and persuasiveness. Some authoritative uses of
foreign law are not only permissible but also necessary. When
domestic law incorporates foreign or international law and
when constitutions are genetically or genealogically related,

184. See generally BICKEL, supra note 27 (discussing American courts' "countermajoritarian" nature and power derived therefrom to ensure constitutional rights).
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sound constitutional interpretation might require the use of
foreign law in an authoritative way.
Third, it is important to have great clarity as to the parameters of foreign law use. This Article's analysis of foreign law
and, in particular, of aggregation, has focused on the consequences of decisions, but the symbolic statement made by the
citation of foreign law may itself have significance. As shown
in the discussion on authoritative borrowing, if foreign law is
cited non-authoritatively, that practice might make the citation
of foreign law itself broadly acceptable, and thus create a migration toward the authoritativeness of foreign law use. The
solution to such slippery slope problems is to have clear rules
to stop slippage or to have concrete reasons for when, how,
and why foreign law is used, so judges in the future will know
how to interpret new situations and draw reasonable lines.
Finally, the most complex mode of foreign law use, aggregation, raises important themes and issues in constitutional interpretation. Whether aggregation is acceptable may depend on
one's view of the countermajoritarian role of courts in the political system and the extent to which universal or community
values exist and can or should be protected by courts. Moreover, the practice of aggregation raises the methodological bar
for engaging comparative sources, not only because it requires
analyzing many countries' decisions but also because it requires assessing how those countries use foreign law. Failing to
engage in that meta-analysis may result in overcounting and
distorting the aggregation. Finally, the nature of the provision
being interpreted is crucial to any analysis. If a provision is narrowly drafted or is accompanied by a well-documented set of
domestic constitutional doctrines to interpret it, it may be more
likely to provide decisive answers to constitutional problems,
thus creating less room for the more problematic authoritative
and determinative versions of aggregation. On the other hand,
if a provision is broad, involves factors which change based on
the time and place, or does not have a detailed doctrinal foundation, constitutional interpretation is less likely to be determinative solely from domestic materials. As a result, the challenges to aggregation may be more significant even as the
added value of foreign law is greater.
The use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation has
had many critics and defenders, but the debate over foreign
law could be furthered if scholars focused more narrowly on
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particular ways in which foreign law is used. Some uses are
largely innocuous, whereas others implicate serious democratic
and methodological concerns. A more carefully tailored debate
might help guide courts to develop a set of doctrines on when
and how foreign law can be used.

